​At sea: On the Indian Navy’s Project 17A

The Indian Navy’s Project 17A is a ₹45,000-crore programme to build seven ‘Nilgiri’-class frigates, with anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine capabilities, as an advanced complement to the ‘Shivalik’ frigates and a precursor to Project 17B. The Project delivered the INS Mahendragiri on April 30, completing six deliveries in 17 months, but had previously faced multiple delays. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India has flagged hundreds of design changes in previous warship classes during construction. Deliveries had been delayed even though ships were nominally complete because they lacked critical components such as engines and sensors, allowing the projects to meet commissioning dates on paper while leaving the hull unprepared for combat. A 2025 CAG report found that the Navy was inducting platforms without building the supporting infrastructure. While Project 17A used 75% indigenous components by value, many critical parts were sourced from abroad, and without them the vessels’ final integration was withheld. Currently, India can build most of each ship but exercises limited control over timelines.

The Indian Ocean carries most of India’s energy imports as well as Chinese naval deployments, but the nature of these challenges alone does not resolve the kind and scale of response they merit. India built the Chain of Static Sensors after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, with radar hardware involving imported parts. The Chain has been extended to Mauritius, Sri Lanka, and the Seychelles, and together with naval platforms forms a detect-decide-respond system. But while naval satellites and underwater sensor networks provide the ‘detect’ aspect, the frigates’ radars and sonars remain the most imported —and thus most delayed — components, limiting the vessels’ ability to function as mobile sensors. Adding more surface combatants is like adding receivers to a network still transmitting a fuzzy picture. Granted, securing sea lanes and addressing non-traditional threats such as Houthi drone and missile activity justify some number of multi-role frigates. However, these platforms are also overkill for countering piracy and smuggling. Heightened surveillance and the Indian Coast Guard also address the 26/11 scenario. And while the People’s Liberation Army Navy has been increasing its submarine presence in the region, an Indian hull lacking the premium sensors required to find these vessels is effectively not responding to China’s presence. What then is the purpose of expanding the high-end frigate fleet? One possibility is to sustain domestic shipyards and absorb new technologies, but this risks allowing industry interests to supersede the demands of the threat environment. In sum, India has a response fleet facing delays, a sensor grid with incomplete coverage and overdue upgrades, a domestic industrial ecosystem that still depends on imports, and, ultimately, investments that are out of step with the threats they are meant to address.