Should the Governor’s address be scrapped?

Does a Governor’s refusal to read the Cabinet-approved opening address violate the Constitution?

P.D.T. Achary: Under Article 176, a Governor is constitutionally mandated to address the State legislature at the commencement of the first session each year and at the first session following a general election. The address sets out the government’s legislative agenda, outlining the policies and programmes it proposes to pursue during the session and the year ahead. The text of this address is prepared by the State Cabinet, and the Governor, as a constitutional functionary, is required to deliver it in that form. A Governor who declines to address the House, or who makes only a token appearance by reading selective portions of the address, cannot be said to be acting in conformity with the mandate of Article 176.

Alok Prasanna Kumar: Such conduct is contrary to the constitutional mandate. The Governor is an integral part of the State legislature, as recognised under Article 168 of the Constitution. This aspect is often overlooked, as the legislature is frequently understood to comprise only one or two Houses of elected representatives. As a constitutional head within this structure, the Governor is expected to facilitate, not obstruct, the functioning of the legislature.

Can a Governor use discretion to alter such an address?

Alok Prasanna Kumar: No. In Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the Supreme Court clarified that the Governor’s address to the House is an executive function performed strictly on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The recurring departures from this constitutional convention are a consequence of the existing institutional design. Unlike the President, who is indirectly elected and subject to impeachment by Parliament, the Governor holds office at the pleasure of the President, in effect, the Union government. Consequently, while the President remains institutionally answerable to Parliament, the Governor’s continuance in office depends upon the confidence of the Union government rather than the legislature within which the office functions.

P.D.T. Achary: I agree. The Governor cannot alter the address prepared by the State Cabinet and is required only to read it before the House. The Governor bears no responsibility for its contents and incurs no liability for what it states. In a representative democracy such as ours, executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers, as the elected representatives of the people. The Governor is therefore precluded from running a parallel government or taking independent decisions de hors the aid and advice of the State Cabinet.

What recourse does a Governor have if there are genuine reservations about the address’s contents?

Alok Prasanna Kumar: The Governor cannot hold an independent view on whether the government’s policies are desirable or even constitutional. Personal opinions need not be forfeited, but they must be conveyed through candid, private exchanges with the State Cabinet. Once the Governor assumes office, such personal views must yield to constitutional discipline. A Governor may offer counsel, but must recognise the limits of the office.

At the same time, it is a healthy convention for the Chief Minister and the Council of Ministers to maintain regular communication with the Governor and to be receptive to any contrarian views he or she might have. Where such rapport and constitutional civility exist, it is unlikely that an elected government would disregard the Governor’s counsel.

Is this address a colonial remnant that ought to be dispensed with?

Alok Prasanna Kumar: The practice ought to be retained, even if it is largely symbolic and serves little functional purpose. The focus should be on addressing instances of constitutionally impermissible gubernatorial discretion rather than abandoning the convention altogether. The address recognises the Governor’s place as an integral part of the legislature and reflects the continuity of the Westminster parliamentary model adopted in India.

P.D.T. Achary: I do not believe there is anything sacrosanct about this practice. At least two other sessions of the State legislature each year commence without a Governor’s address, which indicates that the legislature’s functioning is not inherently dependent on this ceremonial formality. Moreover, Article 175 of the Constitution provides an alternative mechanism through which the Governor may address the House or send messages regarding any pending legislation. Reconsideration of this practice becomes particularly pertinent in light of the increasing instances of visibly partisan conduct by Governors in Opposition-ruled States.

Further, Article 355 imposes a duty upon the Union government to ensure that the governance of every State is carried on in accordance with the Constitution. When a Governor declines to deliver the address mandated under Article 176, it raises concerns about whether that constitutional obligation is being meaningfully upheld. Such situations also risk precipitating a constitutional crisis, as the legislative session cannot formally commence in the absence of the Governor’s address.

Is presidential intervention necessary when Governors fail to discharge their constitutional duties?

P.D.T. Achary: Yes. When Governors act in a partisan manner and fail to discharge their constitutional duties, it is incumbent upon the President to intervene and require the Governor either to perform those duties or to demit office. Article 160 of the Constitution empowers the President to issue directions for the discharge of a Governor’s functions, particularly to address contingencies not expressly provided for in the Constitution. However, there have been no notable instances of Presidents invoking such powers to avert situations where gubernatorial conduct threatens to create a constitutional crisis in the States.

Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin has called for a constitutional amendment to do away with this address. How feasible is it to bring about such an amendment?

P.D.T. Achary: It is unlikely that such a constitutional amendment will be achievable. The Union government is unlikely to support it, and its passage would require a special majority in Parliament — a majority of the total membership of each House and a two-thirds majority of members present and voting. This is a difficult threshold to meet without a broad consensus between the government and the Opposition. Moreover, when the existing framework yields evident political benefit, there is little incentive to alter it.

Alok Prasanna Kumar: Such an amendment would be futile. If the Constitution is to be amended, a more meaningful reform would be to reconsider the manner in which Governors are appointed and removed. Such reform could ensure that Governors remain mindful that their allegiance lies with the Constitution, not the Union government, and that any departure from this role carries consequences for their continuance in office. This also explains why Presidents generally discharge their functions without controversy, while Governors often do not. The former is institutionally accountable to Parliament by virtue of indirect election and the possibility of impeachment.

However, as Mr. Achary has pointed out, even this would require political consensus that may be difficult to secure. Nevertheless, a serious discussion on such reforms is necessary to halt the gradual weakening of constitutional governance in Opposition-ruled States.

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